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MUNICIPALITIES AS RIPARIAN OWNERS
By W. LEWIS ROBERTS*
With the rapid increase in our urban population the ques-
tion of water supply becomes a pressing one for many of our
municipalities. Property values have increased along lakes and
streams and the expense of securing rights under eminent domain
proceedings is very great. It becomes important, therefore, to
know just what rights, if any, a municipality situated on a stream
or lake has as a riparian owner. Of course a city has no right to
take a supply of water from a stream on which it is not situated
without compensating riparian owners for damage done
thereby.1
Now suppose a city located in the vicinity of a river ac-
quires a tract of land along the river for the purpose of getting
a water supply without compensating lower owners who are in-
jured, would the fact that it had become a riparian owner in
such a case give it the right to take water for supplying its in-
habitants 7 It is clear that this would be a non-riparian use of
the water and would not be allowed. Such a case was that of
the City of Emporia v. Soden2 where the municipality purchased
land adjoining and above the mill pond of the plaintiff and ex-
tending to the center of the river. It dug wells near the shore
and also ran one pipe into the pond and took water therefrom
for its citizens. The court laid down the general principle,
"that whatever of benefit, whether of power or otherwise, comes
from the flow of water in the channel of a natural stream, is a
matter of property and belongs to the riparian owner, and is
protected in law as fully as the land he owns. It eannot be taken
for private use except by his consent, and for public use only
upon due compensation."
The law required that a riparian owner make a reasonable
use of the water flowing over his land. He may supply his do-
mestic needs without regard to the effect upon a lower owner
and by the later cases he may also use for irregating or manu-
facturing, but this use must be in connection with the land
through which the stream runs.3 The question of non-riparian
*Profes~or of Law, University of Kentucky.
:1 Stein v. Burden, 24 AI6. 130; Irving v. Media, 10 Pa. Super. CL 132,
affirmed 194 Pa. 648; Aetna M is v. Waltham, 126 Mass. 422.225 Kan. 588, 37 Am. Rep. 265.
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use has often come up in railroad cases where water has been
taken for supplying locomotives as in Garwood v. New York
Central Ry. Co.4 There the court enjoined the railroad, a
riparian owner, from taking water for this purpose. Where the
water is not to be used in connection with the land that is
riparian, the diversion cannot be brought within the general
rule that a riparian owner must make a reasonable use of the
water for irrigation and domestic purposes. 5 The question of
whether it is a reasonable use has been held a question of fact
for the jury.6 The court in Stein v. Burden7 in regard to the
point under consideration said:
"The City of Mobile is not located upon the creek; it is
from three to five miles distant. To hold that a municipal cor-
poration can, from the mere fact of owning land upon a water-
course, acquire the right to divert the water in sufficient quan-
tities to supply the domestic wants of its inhabitants residing at
a distance of from three to five miles, to the injury of the other
proprietors, would be unreasonable in itself, and unjust to those
who have an equal right to participate in the benefits of the
stream."
Where a town or city is situated on the stream the decisions
are not in accord. In California the old Spanish and Mexican
rule prevails. After a long line of decisions in that State it was
finally held in Los Angeles v. Hunters that the city as succes-
sor of the Mexican Pueblo de los Angeles had a right to a public
water supply from the Los Angeles river which flows through
the city and to have a right to the whole river as against private
riparian owners. The city was allowed to enforce this right to
the extent of enjoining landowners in the upper San Fernando
valley from sinking wells and cutting off the underground water
that seeped into the river.9
In Minnesota the court in the case of Minneapolis Mill Co.
v. Water Commissioners,'0 held that the rights of riparian own-
,83 N. Y. 400.
62Meng v. Coffey, 67 Neb. 500.
'Snow v. Parson, 28 Vt. 459; Hayes v. Walden, 44 N. H. 580.
724 Ala. 130.
3 156 Calif. 603, 105 Pac. 755.
'Waters: American Law and French Authority, Samuel C. Will,
33 H. L. R. 157.
58 N. W. 33.
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ers on navigable or public streams of water are subordinate to
public uses of such water, and the public has a right to apply
the waters of a navigable river to public uses without making
compensation to riparian owners. This case was carried to the
United States Supreme Court and the findings of the State Court
sustained on the ground that the local state law as to riparian
rights should prevail.11
There are a few decisions in other states that support the
view of the Minnesota court to the effect that if the state owns
the bed of the streams, the riparian owner has no right to the
flow of the stream in its natural condition as against the state
or one acting under the authority of the state.12
At common law, however, the title to the bed in all streams
that were non-tidal was in the riparian owner. This definition
of a public stream simplified matters and as not many of our
rivers are tidal at any great distance from their mouths it would
seem that the question would seldom or never come up, especi-
ally in our inland jurisdictions. But the courts have confused
the test of the presence of tide with navigability and in this
country the line is generally drawn between streams that are
navigable in fact and those that are not navigable, and the title
to the bed in the former is held to be in the state.
The Kentucky court early adopted the common law test and
held in Berry v. Snyder' 3 that as the tide does not ebb and flow
in the Ohio river, Kentucky riparian owners own to the thread
of the stream and in a conveyence of their land the fee passes
to the center of the river. In this state then it would seem that
water cannot be taken from a river on the ground that it is a
public stream, without compensation to the riparian owners for
injury thereby caused.
When we consider whether a municipality situated on a
stream can exercise the rights of a riparian owner as such and
take water from the stream, and supply its inhabitants therewith
for domestic uses without compensating lower riparian owners
for the damage caused; we find two views expressed in the decis-
ions. The one outstanding decision that cities so situated may
exercise the rights of a riparian owner is that of the Ohio court
168 U. S. 349.
1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd Ed. 1132.
3 Bush 266.
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in the City of Canton v. Shock.14  The city of Canton took
water from the stream on which it was situated and supplied its
inhabitants with water for domestic, commercial and manufac-
turing purposes at a price fixed by the city, so as to produce an
income sufficient to meet expenses of the water system. The
water supply of the plaintiff below for running his grist mill
was thereby impaired and he sued for damages. The court on
appeal took the view that the city was acting within its rights
as a riparian owner and plaintiff could not recover. It said:
"While the inhabitants own their lots individually, the city
owns the streets, the fire department, and all other public prop-
erty and public works, and, in its corporate capacity, provides
for the convenience and welfare of its inhabitants as to streets,
fire protection, lighting, and supplying water; and in such and
other like matters the city overshadows the individuals and
stands in its corporate capacity as a single proprietor extending
throughout its entire limits, and entitled, as such, to all the
rights, and subject to all the liabilities, of a riparian proprietor
on the stream upon which it is situated. Sound reason, the
weight of authority, and the present advanced state of municipal
government, rights, and liabilities, require that a municipality
should be held and regarded, in its entirety, as an individual
entity, having in its corporate capacity the rights and subject
to the liabilities, of a riparian proprietor; and we so hold in
this case .......
"The city having the right to supply water to its inhabitants
for domestic and manufacturing purposes, it can make no dif-
ference in that right that the supply is for pay, rather than for
nothing. The injury, if any, to the lower proprietor, arises
from the taking of the water, and not from the pay received
therefor. ......
"The water taken by the city from the stream for its own
use, and so supplied to its inhabitants, is taken by virtue of the
right of eminent domain, and therefore no compensation need
be made therefor. ... .
"If the upper proprietors have grown so large or become
so numerous as to consume most or all of the water, the lower
proprietors have no cause of complaint, because it is only what
1466 Ohio St. 19, 58 L. R. A. 637, 90 Am. St. Rep. 557, 63 N. E. 600.
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they should have reasonably expected in the growth and de-
velopment of the country, and subject to which contingency they
established their water powers."
This view is fortified by dicta, from two Pennsylvania de-
cisions. In Philadelphia v. Collins'5 it is said: "Every indi-
vidual residing upon the banks of a stream has a right to the use
of the water to drink and for the ordinary uses of domestic life;
and where large bodies of people live upon the banks of a stream,
as they do in large cities, the collective body of the citizens has
the same right, but of course, in a greatly exaggerated degree."
The case of Barre Water Co., Appt. v. Carmes, et at.'6 is
cited as a decision supporting the view of the Ohio court but the
facts do not support such a use of the case although the language
used by Judge Start, who gave the opinion of the court, goes as
far as the Ohio court's decision. The defendant in the court
below was exercising a prescriptive right that had been gained
by its assignor. Speaking of the rights of inhabitants of cities
and towns located on the banks of streams to take water there-
from for domestic uses Judge Start says:
"Dwellers in towns and villages, watered by a stream may
use the water for domestic purposes to the same extent that a
riparian owner can, provided they can reach the stream by a
public highway, or secure a right of way over the lands of others.
It is immaterial how the dwellers on the stream take the water
for the purposes for which they may lawfully use it. They can
drive their cattle to the stream, and allow them to quench their
thirst, and can carry water in pails to their homes; or each
individual can carry the water in a pipe to his dwelling for such
use, provided he can secure a right of way for that purpose; or
the dwellers on the stream may combine their funds to procure
cheaper and better transportation by means of a pipe, and may
use the water for their several necessities, to the same extent
that they could if it flowed past their dwellings in a natural
channel."
This is, to say the least, in marked contrast to the generally
accepted common law doctrine that a city as such is not a ripar-
ian owner, but only its lot owners who front on the stream.'7
"68 Pa. 116, quoted in Barre Water Co. v. Carnes, 65 Vt. 626.
65 Vt. 626, 21 L. R. A. 769, 36 Am. St. Rep. 891, 27 At. 609.
IFarnham, Waters and Water Rights, 603, 609-612; 40 Cyc. 764-765.
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The two eases most often cited in support of this latter view are
Stein v. Burden18 and Emporia v. Soden.19
In the former decision the court said: "That a riparian
proprietor has the right to consume even the whole of the water
of a stream, if absolutely necessary for the wants of himself and
family, has received the sanction of judicial decision: Evans v.
Merriweather, 3 Scam. 496 (38 Am. Dec. 106); Arnold v. Foot,
12 Wend. 330; but if this doctrine be correct, it can have no ap-
plication in the present instance, because it rests upon reasons
which are wholly inapplicable to corporations, which are arti-
ficial bodies, and can have no natural wants."
The court in the latter case, Emporia v. Soden said, "A
second matter of defense is this: While the undiminished flow
of the stream is conceded to be the right of every riparian owner,
yet this right has always been limited to this extent, that each
riparian owner may, without subjecting himself to liability to
any lower riparian owner, use of the water whatever is needed
for his own domestic purposes and the watering of his stock.
The city is a riparian owner, and whatever it uses, little or much,
it is simply taking for domestic purposes. Each individual
citizen of Emporia may buy land on the banks of the river and
then take for domestic uses whatever amount of water he needs.
What the individuals separately may do, the city representing
all the individuals has done . . . . This argument is
plausible, but not sound .......
"The city, as a corporation, may own land on the banks,
and then in one sense be a riparian owner. But this does not
make each citizen a riparian owner."
In Whatcomb v. Fairhaven Land Co.,20 it was decided that
a municipality which owned land on the shore of a navigable
lake could not appropriate a water supply to the injury of own-
ers of land situated on the non-navigable, outlet of the lake, who
had acquired vested rights. And Judge Bird in his opinion in
the case of Cityj of Battle Creek v. Gognac2 said: "As a riparian
owner, the complainant (city) has no right to divert the water
for the purpose of selling it to the inhabitants of Battle Creek."
The Michigan courts also decided the case of ,Stoclk v. City of
24 Ala. 130, 60 Am. Dec. 453.
25 Kan. 588, 37 Am. Rep. 265.
024 Wash. 493, 54 L. R. A. (N. S.) 190.
181 Mich. 241, 148 N. W. 441.
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Hil.dae2 2 where it was held that a city has no right to divert
water as an upper riparian owner and to pump it out of a lake
for the use of citizens generally and to supply manufacturing
establishments within its limits. A similar conclusion was also
reached by the New Jersey Court of Chancery in Higgins v.
Fleming Water C0.23 and by the Pennsylvania court in Irving's
Executors v. Media.2 4
To recapitulate, we have seen that in California municipali-
ties that have succeeded to old Mexican pueblo rights, as in the
case of Los Angeles, at least, may appropriate the flow of streams
on which they are situated for the domestic uses of their inhabit-
ants if necessary. In Minnesota and possibly two or three other
jurisdictions if cities are situated on public streams, it seems
they may supply their inhabitants with water from such streams
without compensating lower riparian owners for any damage
caused thereby. Then we come to the question whether a muni-
cipality located on a stream can claim the ordinary rights of a
riparian owner as such and supply ihe domestic needs of its in-
habitants without having to resort to eminent domain proceed-
ings and compensating lower owners for injuries caused by tak-
ing the water. There is dicta both ways and the Ohio case is
squarely in point to the effect that a city does have this right
and there are several decisions like those of Alabama and Kansas
that municipalities do not have the rights of riparian owners
from the fact that they are situated on streams.
In conclusion it is safe to say that in states where the ques-
tion has not been passed upon the courts are free to follow the
decision of the Ohio court and to hold that municipalities need
not compensate lower riparian owners even if it becomes neces-
sary to take the entire flow of water from a stream for a munici-
pal water supply. Since the common law seems clear that a
riparian owner has such a property right in a stream as entitles
him to have the water flow in its natural way less a slight dimi-
nution caused by upper riparian owners making a reasonable use
of the water, the Ohio decision seems to have the effect of tak-
ing property without due compensation and to be contrary not
- 155 Mich. 375, 119 N. W. 435.
= 36 N. J. Eq. 538.
194 Pa. St. 648, 45 At. 482.
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only to our Constitution but to our sense of what is just and
right. It therefore seems safe to predict that this decision will
never have a wide following and that municipalities, as such,
will not be given the rights of riparian owners simply from the
fact that they are situated on rivers.
